Of course, we all have a rough idea of what we mean when we talk about knowledge. But do we actually know what knowledge really is? It’s certainly worth giving it some thought.

For a long time, the definition held that knowledge is justified true belief, a concept traceable to Plato’s dialogues Theaetetus and Meno. However, since Gettier’s famous (at least in analytical philosophy) 1963 essay Is justified true belief knowledge?, this definition has been regarded as refuted (again: at least in analytical philosophy). Insofar as analytical philosophy currently represents the dominant strand of Western philosophy, and philosophy reflects on the fundamental concepts of science, we must admit that modern science has no concept of knowledge at all, for since Gettier there has been no success in the search for a new definition of knowledge (cf. Baumann 2013, pp. 11–12, Ernst 2019, p. 99, Grundmann 2008, p. 107). So not even science currently knows what knowledge actually is. The individual scientific disciplines, however, appear completely unimpressed by this development and continue to speak of ‘knowledge’ and ‘science’ – without anyone really being able to account for what exactly is meant by these terms.

If we explore the etymology, we find a different result. The German verb ‘wissen’ (and this also applies, for example, to the Greek οἶδα) is actually a past tense form. That is why Germans say: ich gehe – er geht, ich komme – er kommt, ich nehme – er nimmt, and so on. But: ‘ich weiß’ – ‘er weiß’! Completely without the obligatory t for the third-person personal ending in the German present tense, and just as with: ‘ich ging’ – ‘er ging’ (a German form of past tense)! The German wissen is related to the Latin vidēre (to see), and if we take our cue from Ancient Greek, where οἶδα is a perfect tense form of the same root (ϝιδ) and the perfect tense expresses the resultative aspect, we can begin to grasp what ‘knowledge’ actually used to mean. Knowledge is the result of having seen something: what I have seen, that I know.

This is how knowledge was originally understood, but we quickly realise that this concept of knowledge neither corresponds to our everyday usage nor stands up to philosophical analysis. Otherwise, none of us would know that we have a brain or a heart, would we? Or have you ever seen your own brain? I don’t mean pictures of the brain; I mean your own brain. A detailed refutation of the thesis that knowledge is ultimately perception can be found in the dialogue Theaetetus by Plato, which I mentioned earlier. The entire dialogue is devoted to the search for the nature of knowledge, or episteme (ἐπιστήμη). And that perhaps takes us a step further. Only when we realise that we have not recognised something can we set out on the search. Only then do we have a reason to embark on this search. In this sense, then, I hope I have managed to unsettle you a little, for the chances are good that you, too, do not know what knowledge is. And what, then, do you know at all?

Ideally, this will now spark your curiosity: ‘All right then! Go on, tell us what knowledge is!’ – But I am far too much of a Platonist to give such an answer, whether I know it myself or not. An answer served up on a silver platter has never led anyone to true understanding. However, I would be happy to recommend once again at this point the dialogue Theaetetus, as it guides you through all the shoals and treacherous waters of this difficult yet important question. And there is one further point I would not wish to withhold from you. If you are now thinking of the Socratic ‘I know that I know nothing’, please put that out of your mind. It is a misquote (cf. Blößner / Holzhausen 2023, p. 5) and is not recorded anywhere in that form. Such an oxymoron would not be worthy of Socrates’ philosophical mind either. Rather, the search and the examination are worthy of him, which is why I would like to conclude with a genuine quotation from Plato’s works:

Οὐκοῦν ἐπισκοπῶµεν αὖ τοῦτο, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, εἰ καλῶς λέγεται, ἢ ἐῶµεν καὶ οὕτω ἡµῶν τε αὐτῶν ἀποδεχώµεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐὰν µόνον φῇ τίς τι ἔχειν οὕτω συγχωροῦντες ἔχειν; ἢ σκεπτέον τί λέγει ὁ λέγων;
Sokrates in Plato, Euthyphro 9a

Translation (S. F. Seeber): But shall we not examine this again, o Euthyphro, to see whether it is indeed true, or shall we leave it at that and, without further ado, believe both ourselves and everyone else, so that whenever anyone claims that something is a certain way, we agree that it is so? Or must one rather examine what the person who says something actually says?

Recognising one’s own ignorance is the beginning of all insight

So we do not yet have an answer to our question about knowledge. But an answer would be of no value anyway, for it would merely be yet another piece of information that you could add to your store of accumulated opinions. It would not be insight. True insight arises only as the result of one’s own search, whether undertaken alone or in community. However, the search only begins when we truly realise that we are lacking something which we, at the same time, urgently need.

Recognising our own ignorance is therefore the key to gaining any insight at all. Be completely honest with yourself now: do you know what knowledge is? And wouldn’t it be immensely beneficial in life to be able to distinguish knowledge from ignorance?

References:

• Baumann, Peter, 2013: Gettier, Wissen, Zufall. In: Ernst, Gerhard / Marani, Lisa (Hrsg.): Das Gettierproblem. Eine Bilanz nach 50 Jahren. Münster.
• Blößner, Norbert / Holzhausen, Jens, 2023: Nichtwissen als philosophisches Programm. Überlegungen zu Platons ‚Apologie des Sokrates‘. In: Gymnasium, Band 130, Heft 1, p. 1–36.
• Burnet, Ioannes (recognoverunt brevique adnotatione critica instruxit), 1973: Platon. Opera.  Oxford.
• Duke, E. A. / Hicken, W. F. / Nicoll, W. S. M. / Robinson, D. B. / Strachan, J. C. G. (recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxerunt), 1995: Platon. Opera. Tomus I. Oxford.
• Ernst, Gerhard, 2019: Das Gettierproblem. In: Grajner, Martin / Melchior, Guido (Hg.): Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie. Stuttgart, pp. 94–101.
• Gettier, Edmund L., 1963: Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? In: Analysis 23, 6, pp. 121–123
• Grundmann, Thomas, 2008: Analytische Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie. Berlin / New York.